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The assumptions that we live in a rational universe and that we are
rational human beings imply that social events are caused by intentional
human activities. According to the major traditions of Western civiliza-
tions, cooperative activities of producing and exchanging goods (the prov-
ince ofprivate law) and cooperative activities ofprotecting life and property
(the province of public law) are the cumulative result of voluntary agree-
ment between the persons in the society.
Contract as the basis of cooperation may explain how two persons with
equal knowledge and bargaining power agree upon, for example, the sale
of a horse. However, this scarcely explains the reciprocity necessary for
cooperation in more complex commercial transactions. Furthermore, con-
tract is even less satisfactory in explaining and justifying a balance between
individual freedoms and the general interest in the liberal state. Professor
Jorgensen discusses these issues in his analysis of individual rights and con-
tract. Professors Dorsey and Jorgensen served together for several years on
the Executive Committee of IVR.
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND CONTRACT
(FREEDOM AND RECIPROCITY IN CONTRACT LAw)*
STIG JORGENSEN**
I. INTRODUCTION
For several years I have dealt with contract law without ever being
quite satisfied with any legal theories that have been given to explain the
binding nature of contracts. I have been equally dissatisfied with the
conclusions drawn from this aspect of contract law. It has been even less
satisfactory, when other sciences, such as economics, have presumed the
binding force of the contract.
Many years ago as a legal practitioner, I was struck by the difficulty of
* I wish to refer particularly to three of my earlier articles: Private Property and Regulation,
Contract as a Social Form of Life, and The Crisis of Democracy, reprinted in REASON AND REALITY,
109, 129, 145 (1986) [hereinafter REASON AND REALITY]. See also Stig Jorgensen, Contract as
Form, and Grotius' Doctrine of Contract, reprinted in 10 SCANDINAVIAN STUDIES IN LAW 97
(1966), 97 and 13 (1969), 107 reprinted in VALUES IN LAW, 84 (1978).
** Member of the Faculty of Law, Aarhus University 1955-88; Professor of law and jurispru-
dence 1955-88; Member of the executive committee of the International Association of Philosophy of
Law and Social Philosophy 1975-88.
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conforming practice with the theory of contract as a combination of a
promise and an acceptance. Usually one signed a document, which was
written in advance, or one referred to a general formula, or one actually
took commodities in self-service stores and paid at the exit without ex-
changing one word. Several other practical situations could be men-
tioned, only a few of which would resemble the model of contract law.
This discrepancy is a fact that does not affect judges and other jurists,
who consider the parties to be bound all the same.
II. IDEOLOGICAL AND FUNCTIONAL EXPLANATIONS
I have always found that ideological and functional arguments are two
sides of the same coin.' Even Fichte realized that one (as a necessity)
chooses the philosophy that one needs:
Was fur eine Philosophie man wKble, hangt daran ab, was man fur ein
Mensch ist; denn ein philosophisches System ist beseelt durch die Seele des
Menschen, der es hat.2
Historical and other comparative analyses are therefore necessary
means to "reveal" the functional factors that contribute to influencing
our ideological and, consequently, our logical concepts. It seems to be a
fundamental assumption based on history or nature that man is a social
being who must have a certain social organization in order to survive as a
species. From this fundamental assumption the conclusion may be drawn
that an exchange of values or services must take place among human
beings.
This may be called the functional basis of contract in the widest sense.
An essential element in the functional basis of the contract is reciprocity
or "balance," which from time immemorial has been conceived of as the
basic ideological demand on "justice." Aristotle says that private law
and criminal law have always demanded reciprocity and balance (the
commutative justice), whereas the distributive justice, taking as its start-
ing point the merits of the individual, is without importance until the
development of the city-state at the time of Solon.3 Roman law also con-
siders reciprocity as its formal basic principle. Unilateral promises are
binding with due regard given only to formal documents, whereas recip-
1. STG JORGENSEN, LAW AND SOCIETY 100-103 (1971).
2. "What kind of philosophy one chooses depends on what kind of person one is; for a philo-
sophical system is characterized by the aims and goals of the man who has it." (Editor's translation)
3. STI JORGENSEN, VALUES IN LAW 65 n.1; PLURALIS JURIS 11 (1982); REASON AND RE-
ALITY, supra note 1, at 104.
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rocally binding promises are binding in more practical situations. The
same is true of the later English contract law that developed the doctrine
of "consideration." This doctrine has survived - albeit as an empty for-
mality - up to the present time. The idea of the medieval moral philos-
ophy of iustum pretium is based on this practical consideration. The
same is true of the natural law theory's doctrine of mutuality which de-
veloped from this idea. The natural law theory, however, goes beyond
the demand for reciprocity and works out a general doctrine of the bind-
ing force of promises or agreements as a consequence of the ideological
assumption of the individual's sovereignty.
Now we have arrived at the ideological basis of the legal effect of the
contract: an individualistic social conception, which is developed in an
urbanized economy based on division of labour and money. In antique
Athens and later in 18th century Europe the contract was a manifesta-
tion of individual free will. It was an intellectual tool used for justifying
democracy as a system of government through the "social contract" and
the establishment of individual rights and obligations through private
contracts.
Modem moral philosophy, however, has also used the contract as a
normative idea. John Rawls has revived the social contract as a justifica-
tion of a social-liberal moral philosophy. Robert Nozick and Richard
Posner have justified the "minimum state" and the rules of law by mar-
ket economic arguments, which depend on the contractual obligations
justified by the sovereignty of the individuals. F.A. Hayek, on the other
hand, realizes that the economic theory must be subsidiary to the legal
and political theory. He assumes that the human feeling is biologically
attached to what he calls "the small society." The intellect, however,
will often demand nonspontaneous actions when it functions in "the
great society" created by man throughout the ages. Like Hume, Hayek
advances three fundamental laws: 1) protection of private property; 2)
transfer of goods by consent; and 3) fulfillment of given promises. He
bases these laws on the demand for confidence within social life. Without
mutual confidence, any form of individual and social planning would be
impossible. Therefore, the demand for truth has always been
fundamental.
III. REALITIES AND CONCEPTS
As we know, concepts do not exist in the physical world, but only in
the human consciousness as structures of ideas with certain meanings. It
[Vol. 65:722
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is hard to say what is meant by "meaning." I believe, however, that it is
a rather good working hypothesis that the meaning of a word is its "of-
fice," as Niels Egmont Christensen4 put it, i.e., its capability to transmit
associations from one individual to another. Consequently, concepts are
individual in the sense that only individuals think as contrasted to enti-
ties such as "mankind" or "the Danes" that cannot think. On the other
hand, concepts must be intersubjective to be able to transmit the right
"meaning" from the sender to the recipient. Without a certain intersub-
jectivity in the language, any communication would be impossible.
I do not intend to go into detail as far as the philosophy of language is
concerned, but only point out that the linguistic faculty is a human ca-
pacity. Certain animals, for example the chimpanzee, have a rudimen-
tary ability to use abstractions. The systems of communication of these
animals, however, are signalling systems and not systems of concepts
that use symbols to represent constant relations (in contrast to relations
attached to concrete situations) among human beings and things. The
linguistic faculty is a human "faculty" which, like the upright walk, has
to be developed. It is not merely acquired. The linguistic faculty is at-
tached to the left side of the brain (which, incidentally is also the seat of
analytical thinking), in contrast to the right side of the brain, which
mainly works out forms and proportions. Developmental psychology
has illustrated that individuals first develop from concrete applications
and then move towards more generalizing applications of language and
concepts. The development of culture and law demonstrates an identical
progression from a concrete, collective and objective concept towards a
generalizing, individualistic and subjective conception of man and
society.5
It is reasonable to conceive the language as a human "faculty" and
thus the concepts as tools. The "purpose" of these concepts is to pro-
mote man's possibilities of surviving by establishing a refined social sys-
tem of communication.6 This is a very naturalistic way of dealing with
concepts and ideas, but as Aristotle admitted, the certainty of recognition
cannot be "proved." Reality and language belong to different logical cat-
egories. A concept, therefore, cannot be deduced from reality, just as an
"ought" cannot be deduced from an "is." Kantianism assumes that a
connection exists between language and reality. Without this connec-
4. ON THE NATURE OF MEANINGS (1961).
5. REASON AND REALITY, supra note 1, at 148.
6. Id. at 109.
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tion, it would be impossible to communicate with words. Experience
also confirms this fact.7
So it must be assumed that cognition and consequently concepts are
purposive (intentionalistic) in the sense that we talk about what interests
us in a way that reflects our interests. As Rudolph v. Ihering put it,
"Eine Handlung ohne Motiv ist wie eine Wirking ohne Ursache."
IV. DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONCEPTS OF CONTRACT AND RIGHT
These introductory remarks about reality and cognition and about
function and concept illustrate that it is unprofitable if the concept of
contract and the concept of right are understood only from an ideological
point of view. The ideas are only reflections of the function. By this I do
not mean that the ideas are solely another side of the material conditions
- as maintained by a materialistic theory of cognition - but that idea
and function form part of a dialectic process. Ideas and concepts are
parts of a greater system of ideas: ideologies, which at a given time and
place form the "horizon of understanding." This "horizon" is the pat-
tern of interpretation from which we start when we treat reality in-
tending to find a meaning in our cognition and evaluation.
When the contract is understood as a consensus (meeting of minds)
that establishes the private right and duty and exhausts the content of the
obligation, it is evident that this conception results from a picture of man
as an individual with an autonomous will. This conception originated in
ancient Athens but reached its blossom in 17th and 18th century Europe
with Grotius' and Hobbes' teachings of natural law and the later philoso-
phy of enlightenment. Both Grotius and Hobbes used the social contract
as a tool to justify the social organization as originating from the na-
tional will. They reached different results, however, because they evalu-
ated different political experiences. While Hobbes - from a pessimistic
experience - argued for a sovereign monarchy, Grotius favoured a real
democracy. Regardless of the different conclusions, this rejection of the
superhuman sources of the social power eventually influenced Montes-
quieu and Rousseau to defend democracy as the right form of
government.
This support for democracy especially reflected the citizens' interests
7. STIG JORGENSEN, NORM UND WIRKLICHKEIT, RECHTSTHEORIE 1 (1971); TYPOLOOIE
UND REALISMUS, NACHRICHTEN DER AKADEMIE DER WISSENSCHAFTEN IN GOT1INOEN (1971);
LOVMXL OG DOM 89 (1975); and VALUES IN LAW at 9 n.1.
8. "An action without a motive is like an effect without cause." (Editor's translation)
[Vol. 65:722
Washington University Open Scholarship
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND CONTRACT
in partaking in the social power because growing prosperity gave them
considerable economic power. In addition, this new predominant social
group needed new tools and ideas to further promote its trade. A need
arose for a complete liberation from the limitation that the medieval em-
phasis on traditional types of contract imposed on contractual relations.
For this reason, the abstract concept of contract was well suited for
bringing about the necessary flexibility.
The liberal conception of the state was based upon the assumption that
individuals are free and autonomous as well as rational, enlightened and
capable of looking after their own interests. The democratic process re-
sulted from a rational debate among enlightened persons. Private law as
well was dominated by the "principle of will." In the beginning of the
19th century von Savigny had claimed that the state, and thus public law,
had nothing to do with relations pertaining to private law. He opposed
the proposal of codification advanced by Thibaut. Rather, he referred to
the "national spirit" as the real source of private law and found it mate-
rialized not in ancient German law, but in the superior Roman sources of
law.9
Under this conception, the establishment of the obligations was a re-
sult of the parties' sovereign will - "sovereign will" being derived from
the sovereignty of the state; "sovereignty of the state" being derived from
the social contract. Likewise, the content or extent of the obligations was
also considered to be governed by the parties' will. This meant that a
valid contract was not made unless the parties consented, as their dissent
would invalidate the obligation. Invalidation arose because the parties
had different things in mind. Moreover, in principle the parties were
bound only as far as their will could reach or was considered to reach.
Thus, the interpretation of the contracts was based on the parties' subjec-
tive will, regarding both the considered circumstances as well as the un-
considered "assumptions." Consequently, it was presumed that these
assumptions had to be considered from the parties' will.10
V. FROM STATUS TO CONTRACT AND VICE VERSA
It is self-evident that such a theory of will results in practical
problems. It produces uncertainty in contract matters, which contra-
9. REASON AND REALITY, supra note 1, at 67; STIG JORGENSEN, VERTRAG UND RECHT 64
(1968).
10. STIG JORGENSEN, VERTRAGSVERLErZUNG, FESTSCHR1Fr FOR KARL LARENZ 59 (1973).
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venes the fundamental need for predictability in social life. About one
hundred years ago, however, the English legal historian J.S. Maine for-
mulated his famous maxim for the development of contract law: From
status to contract.11 Simultaneously, the German jurist Rudolph V.
Ihering comprised the development of the law of torts in the sentence:
Kein libel ohne Schuld. 12 One year later strict liability had been imposed
on the Prussian railways.13
Maine's maxim was falsified by reality just as was Ihering's and for the
same reason. Clearly, an idea is formulated most beautifully just when it
has culminated. It became obvious at the end of the 19th century that
the technological development contradicted the condition of the individ-
uals' strategic equality, on which the "nightwatchman state" was based.
Capitalism had divided the population into factory owners and workers
opposing one another. Likewise, the conception of the state was changed
from a consensus-model into a conflict-model! Ihering conceived the
state and law as a fight among interests, Karl Marx characterized it as a
fight among "classes."1 4 Private law - especially the law of property -
was changed so that the prevailing "principle of will" was replaced by a
principle of expectation (or trust).1" Not only the problem of dissent but
interpretation was considered objectively. It took as its starting point the
common or typical understanding, just as the extent of the obligation
depended on normal expectations. The legislature began to develop sub-
sidiary rules of law, which were to be used in cases where the parties had
not specifically decided anything. A new problem, however, arose due to
the rapidly changing social conditions, as the legislative activity was too
heavy and incompetent to keep up with the practical needs of a new regu-
lation. The legislature was too engaged in especially political matters to
deal with the economic organization, production and sale.
Trade took control of these matters and made, so to speak, its own
private legislation. Thus, to replace and supplement the delivered "types
of contract," trade worked out new "type contracts." These "type con-
tracts" took either the form of agreed documents, about which opposite
11. ANCIENT LAW, 1861.
12. "No wrong without fault." (Editor's translation)
13. Stig Jorgensen, Decline and Fall of the Law of Torts, 18 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF
COMPARATIVE LAW 43 (1970); JHERINGS ERBE, DIE BEDEUTUNG JHERINGS FUR DIE NEUERE
SKANDINAVISCHE RECHTSLEHRE 125 (1970).
14. REASON AND REALITY, supra note 1, at 68.
15. E.g., CoNTRACr As FORM at n.1; VERTRAG UND RECHT at 75 n.8; VERTRAO-
SVERLTZUNG, supra note 11, at n.9.
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groups of trade came to terms, or the form of one-sided conditions,
which the individual factory or branch of trade worked out on their own.
The former method was used especially within maritime law, which came
about through the adoption of various conventions concerning different
types of charter parties. Also, labour law was established, after tough
conflicts, in the form of"general agreements," which regulated the condi-
tions of the individual labor employments. This pattern was increasingly
followed wherever strong national and international trade interests found
it profitable to agree upon "general terms" of delivery and work out com-
pletely new types of contract (contracts concerning the supply of gas and
electricity, leasing, and so on), where tradition provided no guidance.
Within trade as a whole a need arose to adapt the rules of sale to the
conditions of mass production; standardized production demands stan-
dardized sale in order to facilitate the predictability of the costs of invest-
ment and marketing. As a rule courts went to great lengths to accept
even one-sidedly drafted standard terms as part of a contract that con-
sumers and other buyers had made with the producer or distributor. The
courts generally accepted express terms, unless the terms were unusual
or unreasonable to the customer. The courts undoubtedly upheld terms
of contract to protect industry in its "Griinderperiode" against uncalcu-
lated costs, especially "product liability." When a factory or branch of
trade achieved a monopolistic status, however, the legislature intervened
to protect the consumers against exploitation of their take-it-or-leave-it
situation. Banking and insurance business were regulated. A monopoly
law was introduced, which did not affect private law relations.
During recent years, however, extensive legislation concerning con-
sumer protection has been enacted everywhere. This legislation not only
forbids certain business methods (door-to-door selling), but also in-
troduces non-mandatory rules (i.e. rules the operation of which cannot
be dispensed with by agreement between the parties) concerning hire-
purchase and credit sales. In connection with a general marketing act,
an omnibus clause concerning private law has been carried through in
contract acts. (Danish act, Sec. 36, which governs terms in standard con-
tracts, that are unreasonable to the consumers). 16
In other ways the changed socio-economic conditions have weakened
the traditional features of the contract institution. Nowadays an increas-
16. Stig Jorgensen, Unreasonable Contract Conditions in Nordic Law, THE JOURNAL OF BuSI-
NESS LAW 324 (1975).
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ing part of the formation of "contracts" takes place through "conclusive
acts," which function as if an agreement existed. The decisive factor is
the conduct of the parties, which must be considered a manifestation of
their wish to be bound. Whoever deals at our modem supermarkets or
drives his car into a car park knows that he appropriates something for
which he must pay. In German, this appropriation is called "sozi-
altypisches Verhalten."
These tendencies of development led me to reformulate Maine's thesis
in order to indicate that the ideological justification of private obligations
and rights has shifted towards the material side: Reciprocity (from status
to contract and vice versa).1 7 As already mentioned, we must assume the
condition of men's mutual dependency and consequently of their need
for a social organization. This means that goods have to be produced
and distributed in accordance with certain rules. In primitive societies
the individuals' status within the group determines to what share of the
total yield of the herd, flock, or crop each individual is entitled. The old
get their share because in static societies they represent valuable experi-
ence, while the children represent the future support of the group. Be-
tween different competing groups two possibilities exist: fight for or
exchange goods, the latter of which is a substitute for robbery, just as a
fine is a substitute for revenge in instances of offenses against other
groups or their members.
VI. LIBERTY OF CHOICE AND PUBLIC UTILITY
As already mentioned this fundamental principle of reciprocity is con-
sidered in all cultures as a main variant of justice, if not the only one.
Aristotle found, as we know, that it was the original one. The distribu-
tive justice, according to Aristotle, arose concurrently with the formation
of cities, where the economic life was based upon division of labor and
money economy. On the one hand this creates a need for contractual
relations, and on the other hand makes possible a surplus. This surplus
may be used for the realization of an idea of public utility as the basis of
the distribution of goods according to the individual's deserts (suum
cuique).
We have been following the manifestations of the principle of reciproc-
ity within Roman law, English law, Catholic moral philosophy and ra-
tionalistic natural law. The modem Welfare State also endeavours to
17. REASON AND REALITY, supra note 1, at 129.
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ensure a certain reasonable reciprocity through its regulation, especially
as far as the ordinary consumer's legal situation is concerned. Clearly,
however, reciprocity in the strictest sense of the word - historically as
well as currently - is a moral demand on the secular law, which in this
sense can be enforced only by the court of conscience18 and not by the
secular courts. To Roman law and English law "causa" and "considera-
tion" meant that one-sided obligations could be made only by special
forms. In contrast, a certain "reciprocity" in itself guarantees a sensible
consideration and therefore may also in itself "cause" an obligation ("An
Englishman is not bound because he has made a promise but because he
has made a bargain"). Within natural law the freedom of contract be-
came a basic idea, but still the idea of reciprocity was maintained behind
the scenes in the form of rules of nullity and breach of contract. 19 In the
modem Welfare State the freedom of contract has become less predomi-
nant, and the moral demand for "reasonable" terms has to a correspond-
ing extent been made law.
On the other hand, it is evident that a connection exists between social
organization and the concept of right and contract. If the intention is to
maintain an element of liberty of choice, society cannot take full responsi-
bility for the needs of the population. If this is the case, there will be no
guarantee that the public utility corresponds with the actual needs of the
population. The freedom of contract ensures, so to speak, that the devel-
opment in society is in proper relation to the individual's feeling of
happiness.
This connection between liberty of choice and public utility demon-
strates, in my opinion, the fundamental social problem of the Eastern
and Western Worlds. The concept of right is a product of Western phi-
losophy and expresses the value that the individuals are not means or
objects of society, but goals in themselves.20 The law of society must
therefore ensure each individual an amount of liberty compatible with
other individuals' equal right to liberty and society's interest that general
rules must be conformed with (Kant). According to this analysis, the
concepts of right and contract must change according to the realities in
society, but must in the last resort accept their fundamental anchoring in
the human liberty of choice.
18. VALUES IN LAW at n.l.
19. VERTRAGSVERLETZUNG, supra note 11, at n.9.
20. REASON AND REALITY, supra note 1, at 76.
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